Existential Abuse of Readers in Samuel Beckett’s Malone Dies by Rizvi, Syed Ismyl Mahmood
LANGUAGE FORUM 




Existential Abuse of Readers in Samuel 
Beckett’s Malone Dies 
 
SYED ISMYL MAHMOOD RIZVI 







Malone Dies marks the point where Samuel Beckett foremost 
turns to “metaphysical destruction” of “untrue self,” and 
Derrida’s critique of the notion of “self-presence” of the 
subject. In this article, I examine Beckett’s literary absurdities 
to his readers’ concerns of “abuse” through them. For this 
investigation Malone Dies posits a stream of conflicting 
“linguistic nihilism” to the concerns of deconstructing “untrue 
self,” arguably, which will reflect how abuse of Beckettian 
readers is stimulated. In this context, abuse is specific forms of 
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emotional tensions aroused by the readers encounter with the 
Beckettian intersubjectivity. In particular, the existential model 
of abuse will be analysed as a part of beyond “self-
deconstruction” autonomy.  
 
Malone Dies, the second novel of Samuel Beckett’s trilogy 
begins with the protagonist Malone, an elderly man confined to 
his deathbed in a room, unable to move and waiting for his death. 
To quote from Malone Dies: “When I have completed my 
inventory, if my death is not ready for me then, I shall write my 
memoirs” (Beckett 1991: 184). “I am being given, if I may 
venture the expression, birth to into death, such is my 
impression” (Beckett 1991: 114). And while waiting for the 
death Malone starts writing his autobiography: 
 
I SHALL SOON BE QUITE DEAD AT LAST IN SPITE OF ALL. 
Perhaps next month. Then it will be the month of April or of May.                                                            
(Beckett 1991: 173) 
     
It is clear here that Malone wishes simply to die. With him 
Beckett intends for his readers to arrive at Nothingness. But in 
abject nothingness there is somethingness that may abuse the 
conscious reader’s ordinary emotion into the unusual. 
Immediately, a skeptical reader may question: How can be a 
reader abused by reading Malone Dies? To find the answer 
requires putting into question the literary notions of “expression,” 
“experience,” and “consciousness.”  
Furthermore, the reading of Malone Dies suggests that, 
during comprehension, the reader generates some form of 
perceptual simulation that represents attributes implicit in the 
text. Similarly, a perceptual simulation appears to be generated 
during concept property verification tasks (Kan, Barsalou, 
Solomon, Minor & Thompson-Schill 2003; Solomon & Barsalou 
2001; Strack 2011: 36). In this regard, there are strong 
connections between language and emotion. When reading or 
listening, we often find ourselves becoming sad, angry, afraid, 
happy, joyous, or aroused depending on the meaning of the 
language we are processing. It is likely that much of the pleasure 
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we gain in reading and listening to narratives and poetry is 
directly related to an author’s skill in producing these emotional 
states in us. In fact, language can be a reliable method for 
inducing emotional changes in experimental situations. 
Moreover, the emotional states of readers influence their 
judgments of, and memory for, fictional character traits (Erber, 
1991; Laird, Wagener, Halal & Szegda 1982). It may be 
subsumed that if these emotional states with the reader are 
nudged according to Malone’s (a fictional character) inherent 
traits then the output would be subversive. The reader notes that 
the narrative voice of Malone is subjectively painful to read on, 
that the inversion of the text even into the subconscious mind of 
the reader disperses his emotions.  
Before exploring on the point of “abuse of reader,” however, 
I want to shed light on the whole conception of the relation 
between language, thought, feeling and the world, which Malone 
Dies undoubtedly expresses. However, the word “abuse” can be 
interpreted into a number of different ways as: mock, ridicule, 
shock, exhaust, insult, or bully. In this connection, I examine in 
this article how Malone fills the reader with the images of terror 
and exercises their access-consciousness into terror-
consciousness. Phenomenally, access-conscious are thought, 
belief and desire expressed unconsciously by the reader. This 
concealment of consciousness takes two forms according to 
Heidegger’s “modern representational thinking,” and what 
Jacques Derrida elects as “self-presence.” This theory of 
authenticity conceptualizes “self existence” as a self-reflective 
and emotional experience. Unconsciously, our psyche and body 
are moulded by “emotional experiences” and then, “it’s vague, 
life and death” (Beckett 1991: 206). In this way in the act of 
reading Beckett’s negative words has some thrusting 
“metaphorical attraction” that makes the reader now much closer 
to the physicality of the text, and much more closer to Malone 
with “terror.” Thus, negative words used in Malone Dies, such 
as, “swelling,” “decaying” and “dying,” can alter the expression 
of genes, weakening areas in reader’s frontal lobes and disrupting 
his brain’s cognitive functioning. Conventionally, hostile 
language, such as, “I shall soon be quite dead at last in spite of 
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all” (Beckett 1991: 173) can disrupt specific genes that play a 
key part in the production of neurochemicals that protect us from 
stress. However, a single negative word can increase the activity 
in our amygdala (the fear centre of the brain). This releases 
dozens of stress-production hormones and neurotransmitters, 
which in turn interrupts our brain’s functioning – This is 
especially with regard to logic, reason, and language (Borchard 
2013). In this regard Andrew Newberg, M. D. and Mark Robert 
Waldman write in their book Words Can Change Your Brain, 
that “a single word has the power to influence the expression of 
genes that regulate physical and emotional stress” (2012: 3). 
Malone is one of Beckett’s “characters that resemble 
paralytics,” and with him Beckett “wishes to describe the 
universal, timeless human being racked by the horrors of 
castration anxiety. Castration anxiety is one of the major 
psychical obstacles to creation” (Anzieu 1986: 251). At the same 
time, castration anxiety represents a threat to the subject, who 
“risks the loss not of a part (castration) but of the totality of his 
living being” (Kristeva 1982: 64). This thought may appear 
highly disturbing with its compressed expression; the reader may 
feel uneasy to read the text given below, as in a flux of 
scatological mockery the images uncover:   
 
I would die delighted, she would close my eyes and put a plug in 
my arse-hole, as per instructions.  
(Beckett 1991: 273) 
 
So that I would have hesitated to exclaim, with my finger up my 
arse-hole for example, Jesus-Christ, it’s much worse than 
yesterday, I can hardly believe it is the same hole. I apologise for 
having to revert to this lewd orifice, ‘tis my muse will have it so. 
(Beckett 1991: 101) 
 
I’ll let down my trousers and shit stories on them: stories, 
photographs, records, sites, lights, gods and fellow-creatures, the 
daily round and common task. Observing all the while, Be born, 
dear friends, be born. Enter my arse. You’ll just love my colic 
pains. It won’t take long, I’ve the bloody flux.  
  (Beckett 1991: 383-384) 
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In the above texts the physicality of the words like anus, and 
arse-hole “create the same cognitive anxiety in their reader that 
exists in their characters, so that when incidents such as” Malone 
demanding to his caretaker Moll to block the continuation of his 
excremental processes after his death “is demystified, the reader 
is left feeling” (Davis 2005: 21) with “textual anxiety.” Indeed, 
in his “textual anxiety” the susceptible reader ponders over the 
wobbling concepts, where he does not giggle and does not find 
the “expression” pleasurable at all but he is sensually abused 
with the image of “anus absurdity.” This force of the literal 
metaphors compels the reader in his pursuit for clarification and 
framing-effect (one thing in other) for the image produced in his 
mind. His metaphorical assertion brings him to visualise familiar 
or unfamiliar physicality of the image. Still, it is not mere 
understanding of the visibility of the image to signify of 
resemblance or of identity but most importantly the “sensory 
assault” led by it. As Donald Davidson writes, “a metaphor 
doesn’t say anything beyond its literal meaning” (Davidson 
1979: 30) and “an account of metaphor that denies that it is a 
form of communication will thus not only have difficulty saying 
what understanding or misunderstanding can consist in, it will 
also encounter problems in saying how the nonassertoric 
framing-effect takes place” (p. 37). Thus, the reader may become 
a helpless victim of the disturbing “mental image,” though this 
and related images did dominate him and may assault his 
thinking. Now what I argue that not only metaphors of Beckett’s 
terror unearth exhaustion, trauma, threat, harassment, fear, 
suffering, panic, emptiness and frustration but they make the 
reader feel that Beckett’s characters onto him launch them 
(precisely, one by one or at once all of them) and he cannot 
escape them even if he wishes to. Although the metaphorical 
destructibility of thought (e.g. the non-being) at every scale has 
limits of destructibility, it has limits of interpretation, and it has 
limits of limit itself. For this, Berggren concludes that “all truly 
creative and non-mythic thought, whether in the arts, the 
sciences, religion or metaphysics, must be invariably and 
irreducibly metaphorical” (Berggren 1962-1963: 472). To quote 
from Malone Dies: “What have I omitted? Little things, nothings. 
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They will come back to me later, make me see more clearly what 
has happened and say, Ah if I had only known then, now it is too 
late” (Beckett 1991: 265). “God does not seem to need reasons 
for doing what he does, and for omitting to do what he omits to 
do, to the same degree as his creatures” (Beckett 1991: 89). 
Thereby the reader may ask: Why Beckett created Malone dying 
in loneliness and helplessness? As Knowlson states, Beckett 
conveys “a view of life which sees birth as intimately connected 
with suffering and death and which sees life as a painful road to 
be trod” (Knowlson 1997: 2). He suggests of Beckett’s “early 
fascination with the mineral, with things dying and decaying, 
with petrification” (Knowlson 1997: 29). He also states that 
Beckett “linked this interest with Sigmund Freud’s view that 
human beings have a prebirth nostalgia to return to the mineral 
state” (1997: 29). In this scenario Sigmund Freud claims: “The 
aim of all life is death” (Freud 1920: 38). And Beckett puts in 
Malone Dies:  
 
I know those little phrases that seem so innocuous and, once you let 
them in, pollute the whole of speech. Nothing is more real than 
nothing. They rise up out of the pit and know no rest until they drag 
you down into its dark. 
(Beckett 1991: 192)  
 
For this conception of “the Nothing” and, in particular, the theory 
that “naught is more real” than this “Nothing,” Beckett is 
drawing, as he indicates, on the atomist theory of Democritus of 
Abdera, one of the pre-Socratics on whom he took extensive 
notes in the early 1930s (Weller 2006: 70). In a flux of reading 
the text, although the reader may feel associated with Malone. 
With this the reader may be transported into the nothingness of 
Malone and he may discursively feel as a “non-being.” The 
subjectivity of “non-being” is pre-transcendence of the absolutely 
self-regulating being. It is for this reason that the “non-being” is 
situated above and beyond both the “metaphysical self” (more 
precisely, the noumenal self) and the “transcendental self” (as 
“external reality” of self). To make it more clear, previously 
many thinkers, taking their lead from the French philosopher, 
SAMUEL BECKETT’S MALONE DIES 
 
163
René Descartes, had believed that, whatever our doubts about the 
nature of “external reality,” we knew with complete clarity the 
contents of our own minds. Freud disabused them of this illusion. 
Not only is there an unconscious, a part of the mind to which we 
have no conscious access, but unconscious irrational forces 
inform our thought and behaviour in ways of which we are 
unaware. We know not what we do (Wake & Malpas 2013: 74). 
All access to the world is mediated by the mind, which is in turn 
structured by some language system or other. Hence the 
“problem of presence”: metaphysics is based on an illusion 
(Vanhoozer, James & Benson 2006: 60). According to James K. 
A. Smith, Vanhoozer goes on to formulate his reading of Derrida 
in terms of “presence” and “absence” but “Derrida’s analysis of 
language destroys the ideal of pure presence”; presence “is only a 
mirage” (Smith 2006: 114). In this regard Anthony Ulhmann 
writes, “What it means to think; indeed, it formulates a new 
image of thinking for literature, one which involves a failure of 
thought, as the self mercilessly seeks out itself and fails to grasp 
it. It is an image of the absence of self-presence and, because it 
follows Malone Dies, it refers the problem of such absence back 
from the problem of thinking itself (in The Unnamable) to the 
problem of the interrelation between the writing and the one who 
writes (Malone Dies) (Uhlmann 2006: 108).  
Ultimately, the reader unconsciously permits Beckett’s 
neuro-thematic writing culture to instigate in him a primordial 
sense of “metaphysical destruction” of his “untrue self.” The 
metaphysical destruction of untrue self exquisitely maintains the 
precarious gap and balance between self-annihilation, which does 
not propound “identity-escape” (that is exchangeability between 
different identities), and self-disintegration, which does not 
necessarily culminate with death, but only through an arbitrary 
act of reincarnation of the self. Later on, the contiguous 
termination of the self uncovers the “non-self.” As Malone 
remarks, “And on the threshold of being no more I succeed in 
being another. Very pretty” (Beckett 1991: 194). In this way the 
reader is imprisoned within a world of “textual illusion” where 
he is alienated from his self-presence, and thereafter, he attains 
this “untrue self” = “false self” = “non-self” which reflects the 
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never-ending search for self-discovery. The false self is 
alternatively described as empirical self and ego-self, while the 
true self is perceived as the transcendent self (Merton 1967: 7). 
The false self is characterised by superficial consciousness, as 
opposed to the deep transcendent self that awakens in 
contemplation (p. 7). According to Merton (Merton 1979b: 86), 
the true self is not easy to find, precisely it is hidden in obscurity 
and nothingness (Jennifer Slater O. P. 2012: 40). With this we 
must note that the untrue self of the reader may differ from 
Malone’s untrue self, and when they interact within premises of 
“cognitive empathy” some points of comparison and conflict 
among them succinctly arrive. Such conflict between them 
becomes the conflict between the self and the other which 
emerges in a state of terror-consciousness. It is possible with the 
reader’s “reflexivity of consciousness” which Heidegger 
contends: “only because the ‘there’ has already been disclosed in 
a state-of-mind can immanent reflection come across 
‘experiences’ at all” (Heidegger 1962: 175, 136). 
In the light of foregoing, the reader finds that Malone is still 
seized into self-inflicted, but mostly in the flux of being. In this 
regard Ethel F. Cornwell claims that Malone “does not seek his 
identity, he flees from it; his quest is for anonymity, for self-
annihilation” (Cornwell 1993: 41). As Malone asserts: “The 
forms are many in which the unchanging seeks relief from its 
formlessness” (Beckett 1991: 198). On the one side by the 
endless story telling Malone exactly evokes the formlessness of 
his “untrue self” and on the other side the untrue self of the 
reader splits up into parts that make him feel hopelessness, 
hollowness, cynicism and emptiness. With each of them the 
reader faces multiple metaphysical questions about his own 
existence and he gets no answer. This, however, is a biggest 
insult to his intelligence that he fails to find the answer. As we 
know human beings are known for their wit, intelligence and 
quest for solving questions, issues and problems. On the 
contrary, Malone is not desperate to solve the problem of his 
identity and selfhood. As he states: “But what matter whether I 
was born or not, have lived or not, am dead or merely dying, I 
shall go on doing as I have always done, not knowing what it is I 
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do, nor why I am, nor where I am, nor if I am” (Beckett 1991: 
219). In my view, the answer to our existence is hidden in the 
logical space of silence. For this Beckett asserts, “The experience 
of the reader shall be between the phrases, in the silence 
communicated by the intervals, not in the terms of the statement” 
(Beckett 1932: 138). As Malone says, “that silence of which, 
knowing what I know, I shall merely say that there is nothing” 
(Beckett 1991: 247) “and indeed the silence at times is such that 
the earth seems uninhabited” (Beckett 1991: 253). For this 
Beckett claims: “Every word is like an unnecessary stain on 
silence and nothingness” (Gruen 1969: 210). Therefore, it is clear 
that silence represents nothingness.  
 
Silence = Nothingness 
 
Also we have evolved out of nothing and we will return to the 
state of nothingness from which we rose. “Nothingness” is not 
bound in time, matter, and energy. Similarly, any word or sound 
also originates from silence and dies into silence.  
Into the further investigation of “abuse of reader” Beckettian 
intersubjectivity paves the route for the subtleties of investigation 
into his proponent readership, as the acquisition of narrative 
language is “serene linguistic nihilism” (Cusset 2008: 227). For 
example, in The Deconstructive Character Walter Benjamin 
writes: “Some pass things down to posterity, by making them 
untouchable and thus conserving them, others pass on situations 
by making them practicable and thus liquidating them. The latter 
are called the destructive” (R, 302). Subjectively, the text passes 
the mind of the reader through “incestuous, violent, disturbing, 
and overwhelmingly realistic” (Ashwood 2003: 1) illusory 
situations and thus liquidating him. Furthermore, such a notion of 
reading can be correlated with a nonreductive concept of 
experience: linked to language and not merely to perception, 
experience becomes not only a form of interpretation; it is also a 
form of prophecy, a way of taking hold of the future (Osborne 
2005: 227). It can also be said that the paradoxical relationship 
between the Beckettian text and the reader must take account of 
multiple “reflection of consciousness” the words employ. At the 
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same time, the syntax has exploded out the words to function as 
psychic-semiotic elements, whereas the reader oscillates between 
different modes consciousness interplayed according to 
reminiscent of words. On the contrary, Derrida insists that 
writing is ‘not a supplement to the spoken word’ but a quite 
different performance (Derrida 1976: 14). Each reader has his 
own private reading words of Beckett and these words aren’t 
mere “coded symbols” (Ong 2002: 73), but they have invisible 
voices, untouchable forces, and they have unexplored essence of 
life that accentuate sensations, emotions and feelings. The 
psychotic-effects of the written words may be larger and long-
lasting than the spoken words or reverse of each other. Though 
Derrida claims that ‘there is no linguistic sign before writing’ 
(Derrida 1976: 14). But neither is there a linguistic ‘sign’ after 
writing if the oral reference of the written text is adverted to. 
Though it releases unheard-of potentials of the word, a textual, 
visual representation of a word is not a real word, but a 
“secondary modelling system” (cf. Lotman 1977). Thought is 
nested in speech, not in texts, all of which have their meanings 
through reference of the visible symbol to the world of sound. 
What the reader is seeing on this page are not real words but 
coded symbols whereby a properly informed human being can 
evoke in his or her consciousness real words, in actual or 
imagined sound. It is impossible for script to be more than marks 
on a surface unless it is used by a conscious human being as a 
cue to sounded words, real or imagined, directly or indirectly 
(Ong 1983: 84).  
Now the reader may anticipate objection over the concept of 
“abuse” by arguing that it is impossible to be abused by the 
prospect of reading Beckett. With this my further investigation 
into the psyche of readership may come to an end. But in the 
prodigy of ending there is endlessness. As Malone says: 
“Nothing is impossible, I cannot keep on denying it much 
longer” (Beckett 1991: 185). The Beckettian language functions 
as transparency much beyond “self-reflectivity.” According to 
Ludwig Wittgenstein “beyond the bounds of the language lies 
nonsense – propositions which cannot picture anything” but still 
‘there is something to be shown and he characterises it as 
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mystical” (SEP 6). Then the reader may ask further: Is abuse of 
reader metaphorical? Until we know the answer to this question 
or to any question it remains quite mystery to us. So the question 
of abuse is not a mystery but we are mysterious, more 
specifically, our mind is mysterious. Henceforth, we are lost in 
the world of the words that we have stopped thinking that there is 
the same world beyond words which can be interpreted without 
them. For example, we see things but we don’t see them 
completely and for seeing them completely we have to adopt the 
panoptic precision with reductionism. We think that we are 
safely reading Malone Dies but we are abused by reading. We 
think that we are conscious but many of such conscious thoughts 
and actions are motivated and governed by unconscious fears and 
desires. We are up to now so much lost into the jungle of the 
words that all language, whatever its style, inevitably falsifies 
reality: “Live and invent,” Malone says. “I have tried. I must 
have tried. Invent. It is not the word. Neither is live” (Beckett 
1991: 194). According to Nietzsche, it is the individual’s 
consciousness, then, that words and world come together. The 
mind mirrors reality, and language mirrors thought. The issue is 
rather where language and thought about the world are primarily 
about ourselves: how we see, how we experience, how we talk, 
and therefore how we think, about the world. According to the 
non-realist, nothing is naturally given; everything is culturally 
graven. In short, all the significant distinctions that make a 
meaningful world out of human experience are, in the final 
analysis, linguistic creations. The non-realist is an unbeliever for 
whom words and concepts are nothing more than human 
contrivances (Vanhoozer, James & Benson 2006: 45). Similarly, 
Richard Rorty comments: “This post-positivistic kind of analytic 
philosophy thus comes to resemble the Nietzsche-Heidegger-
Derrida tradition in beginning with criticism of Platonism and 
ending in criticism of Philosophy as such.” Therefore, Derrida 
rejects the metaphysical impulse as misleading oriented to 
“transcendence,” that is, to an extra-linguistic reality that can 
nevertheless be represented by language (pp. 56-57). 
Prominently, here a question arises: What is language? This 
language is the expression of the inherence of nihilism in 
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metaphysics and of metaphysics in nihilism (Miller 1979: 217). 
Expression is also a language. The word “abuse” is also a 
language. Meanwhile, the reader’s cognitive experience with 
Malone Dies enables him to classify between the happening, 
thoughts, and experiences in his mind, apparently, there is no 
means of escape from subjectivity of expression (either 
consciously or unconsciously), and therefore, Malone’s 
expression is disturbing, henceforth, the argumentation evolve in 
the concept of “mental abuse.” Sometimes the reader may feel 
melancholic about Malone. It is hard to measure the quality of 
the reader’s feelings which overlaps with sadness. But it is the 
reflexive memory that evokes melancholy when the reader 
compares Malone to himself. Adhesively, the reader finds that 
his emotional stimuli are highly arousing while reading the 
negative words to positive words low arousing. As we know that 
‘emotions are not spatially located in the body, nor are they are 
distinct entities that could be “let out.” Rather, we might 
distinguish between emotions as biochemically driven, 
unconscious bodily responses, and the words that describe 
various emotions and which are constitutive of what we take 
emotions to be (Gergen 1994; LeDoux 1998). While the reader 
tries to free himself from his “emotional consciousness” he does 
not get rid from it for some time.  
In the end the reader through the panoptic precision of 
Malone’s hollowness sees his very own obscure ending at 
cognitive depths, and feels Malone saying to him: 
 
I feel nothing. It is there I die, unbeknown to my stupid flesh. […] 
My concern is not with me, but with another, far beneath me and 
whom I try to envy, of whose crass adventures I can now tell at 
last, I don't know how. Of myself I could never tell, any more than 
live or tell of others. How could I have, who never tried? To show 
myself now, on the point of vanishing, at the same time as the 
stranger, and by the same grace, that would be no ordinary last 
straw. Then live, long enough to feel, behind my closed eyes, other 
eyes close. What an end.  
(Beckett 1991: 186, 19) 
     
SAMUEL BECKETT’S MALONE DIES 
 
169
Finally, Malone dies, not knowing who he is. And the reader 
wishes to escape from the “textual anxiety” or from the 
meaningless stories (which in many cases is interpretively 
shocking) or from the insane vagrant characters (making their 
terrified and desperate “fictional voices” which have grotesque 
echoes and screams) or from the images of the degrading 
portrayal of humanity, and altogether from the “exhaustive 
fiction” (e.g. Malone Dies). Wholesome he fails to escape from 
them. As Malone remarks: “It is true you know nothing of this, 
you flatter yourself you are hanging by a thread like all mankind, 
but that is not the point. For there is no point, no point in not 
knowing this or that, either you know all or you know nothing” 
(Beckett 1991: 225). Lastly, the reader may ask to his “non-self”: 
Am I a human fragment to the degrading humanity or suffering at 
the hands of Beckett’s “frosty ethics.” Malone replies to him: 
“And when (for example) you die, it is too late, you have been 
waiting too long, you are no longer sufficiently alive to be able to 
stop” (Beckett 1991: 230). The anxious reader reads next, “That 
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